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Abstract 
 
Water quality trading is a policy tool that could improve the cost effectiveness of 
achieving environmental goals, but it is not currently used in the state of Georgia. This 
paper seeks to evaluate the applicability of water quality trading in Georgia watersheds 
with a specific focus on legal issues. This paper reviews Georgia law and regulations to 
evaluate barriers to and support for water quality trading. It also reviews water quality 
trading policies from other states and explores the value of adopting a state water quality 
trading policy in Georgia. The paper concludes that while existing law provides implicit 
authority to implement water quality trading in Georgia, inadequate regulatory pressure 
in most Georgia watersheds and possible legal challenges could be significant 
impediments to implementing water quality trading in the state at this time. The paper 
also suggests that successful pilot trades should precede the development of statewide 
water quality trading policy. 
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Water Quality Trading: Legal Analysis for Georgia Watersheds 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Over the past several years, policy makers have developed a high level of interest 
in the use of water quality trading (WQT) to manage water pollutants in watersheds 
across the U.S. In 2003, the EPA issued a national water quality trading policy to support 
the development and implementation of trading in water quality management (USEPA, 
2003). The EPA advocates WQT as a cost-effective means to preserve and improve water 
quality. To date there are over forty WQT programs established in the U.S. and an 
additional thirty programs or more currently in development, but at this time, WQT has 
not yet been established in Georgia.  
For the past three years, WQT has been the subject of an on-going research 
project at Georgia State University and the Georgia Water Planning and Policy Center. 
This research is intended to assist Georgia policy makers in evaluating the applicability 
of WQT in Georgia. As a part of this research, this paper offers a policy analysis of legal 
issues relating to WQT. It reviews Georgia law and regulations for barriers to and support 
for water quality trading. It also reviews water quality trading policies from other states 
and explores the value of adopting a state water quality trading policy in Georgia. The 
paper concludes with policy recommendations relating to the potential future adoption of 
water quality trading in Georgia. 
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II. Background 
Water quality trading is a policy that allows pollutant sources to trade pollution 
control obligations in order to lower the joint costs of compliance. Trading takes 
advantage of differences in pollution reduction costs among pollution sources. The costs 
of pollution reduction are not uniform. Different pollution sources have different 
pollution reduction costs as a result of factors such as treatment plant size, level of 
reduction required, and available treatment technology. When trading is an option, a 
discharger can choose between reducing its pollutant load and purchasing pollutant 
reduction credits from another source that has exceeded its own pollution reduction 
obligation. Trading allows pollution sources to achieve environmental goals more cost-
effectively. Furthermore, trading can be designed to achieve environmental improvement 
by requiring a trade premium (i.e., the trading ratio is greater than 1:1). 
The success of water quality trading hinges on a broad range of economic, 
environmental, social, and political factors. Implementation is complex, and the potential 
benefits can only be realized when trading is implemented under appropriate conditions. 
Despite its complexity, trading can offer a tool for enhancing the cost effectiveness of 
water quality expenditures. With over 50% of the state's rivers and streams only partially 
supporting or not supporting water quality standards, the costs of restoring water quality 
in Georgia's waters will be high. A policy tool that can improve the cost effectiveness of 
water quality expenditures deserves serious consideration. 
Nationally, water quality trading is a subject of great interest to policymakers, and 
research efforts on the topic are underway in watersheds around the U.S. In Georgia, over 
the past few years, the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies (AYSPS) at Georgia 
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State University and the Georgia Water Planning & Policy Center (GWPPC) have issued 
several policy papers that have examined the potential use of water quality trading in 
Georgia (Morrison, 2002; Cummings et al., 2003; Rowles, 2004; Jiang et al., 2004; 
Rowles, 2005(a); Rowles, 2005(b); Rowles, 2005 (c); Jiang et al., 2005). Research on 
water quality trading at AYSPS and the GWPPC is continuing in collaboration with the 
Warnell School of Forestry at the University of Georgia. This research project aims to lay 
the policy research foundation on the issue of WQT for Georgia. Elsewhere in the state, 
another project at the University of Georgia is studying the potential use of water quality 
trading in the Lake Allatoona watershed in northern Georgia. 
At this time, Georgia is beginning the process of setting a statewide plan for 
managing water and water quality through the Georgia Water Council, established by the 
Comprehensive Statewide Water Management Planning Act in 2004. This process 
presents the opportunity to discuss how water quality will be managed in the state for the 
foreseeable future. In these discussions, the potential use of WQT in Georgia should be 
considered as a potential tool to enhance the cost-effectiveness and flexibility of water 
quality regulation. This paper and other papers issued through this project are intended as 
a resource to assist in evaluating whether WQT is an appropriate tool for Georgia. 
Enthusiasm for WQT has driven several states to develop WQT policies and 
programs. Because of the complexity of implementing WQT, initiation of WQT requires 
a substantial investment in research, policy development, and partnership building. Many 
other states have already made this investment, but the returns to their investments are 
not yet clear. This research effort is designed to learn from the experiences of other states 
that have preceded Georgia in the use of WQT. 
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To evaluate the applicability of WQT in Georgia, this research project has several 
components: 
(1)Evaluate 14 major Georgia watersheds for their suitability for WQT: This 
evaluation uses criteria identified in our study conducted last year of the opportunity for 
water quality trading in the Upper Chattahoochee watershed (Rowles, 2004). These 
criteria include: environmental suitability, regulatory incentive, participant availability, 
economic incentive, and stakeholder response. (See Rowles, 2005(a)) 
(2) Analyze the legal framework for water quality trading in Georgia: (this paper) 
Here, we examine the legal issues surrounding the possible implementation of WQT in 
Georgia by reviewing existing Georgia policy and by analyzing water quality trading 
policies and programs adopted in other states that could provide policy models for 
Georgia. 
(3) Develop estimates for point source treatment costs: The driving force of WQT 
is the variability of treatment costs among various pollution sources. In this project, we 
have developed cost estimates for point source treatment of phosphorus. These estimates 
can be used to evaluate demand for WQT by point sources, which are usually the primary 
buyers in WQT markets due to their regulatory obligations. Two reports have been issued 
on the methods and results of estimating these costs. (See Jiang et al., 2004; Jiang et al., 
2005). 
(4) Develop a simulation model for water quality trading in a Georgia watershed: 
The STAND model (Sediment-Transport-Associated Nutrient Dynamics) developed at 
the University of Georgia will be used to bring together the results of our recent work to 
develop cost curves for phosphorus reduction by municipal wastewater treatment plants 
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in a sophisticated water quality model that will be able to demonstrate the effects of water 
quality trading under various scenarios. 
(5) Conduct a monitoring study to support the development of trading ratios 
applicable for point to nonpoint source trades: Continuous sampling methods will be 
used to estimate pollutant loads from potential sellers of nonpoint source pollutant 
credits. Monitoring results will support modeling efforts described above and provide a 
basis for the development of trading procedures, including trading ratios. 
(6) Engage stakeholders in discussion about the development of water quality 
trading in Georgia: A new water quality trading program would affect stakeholders 
across the state. Successful adoption of water quality trading in Georgia will require that 
stakeholders are involved in the discussion of how trading should be implemented in the 
state. The primary focus of this part of our research effort is a stakeholder workshop 
planned for the fall of 2005. The workshop will be designed to provide an educational 
simulation of the use of market mechanisms in water quality policy. We are also 
continuing and expanding our efforts to meet with stakeholders from community 
organizations, private interests, and all levels of government to provide information and 
facilitate discussion on the issue. 
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III. Legal Review for Water Quality Trading in Georgia 
 
While Georgia law does not explicitly provide a basis for water quality trading in 
the state, there is implicit legal authority that could be used as a foundation for the 
creation of a water quality trading framework in Georgia. The Georgia Water Quality 
Control Act states that it is: 
the policy of the State of Georgia that the water resources of the state shall be 
utilized prudently for the maximum benefit of the people, in order to restore and 
maintain a reasonable degree of purity in the waters of the state and an adequate 
supply of such waters, and to require where necessary reasonable usage of the 
waters of the state and reasonable treatment of sewage, industrial wastes, and 
other wastes prior to their discharge into such waters. To achieve this end, the 
government of the state shall assume responsibility for the quality and quantity of 
such water resources and the establishment and maintenance of a water quality 
and water quantity control program adequate for present needs and designed to 
care for the future needs of the state. O.C.G.A. § 12-5-21 (a).  
Further, the Act holds that: 
the achievement of the purposes described in subsection (a) of this Code section 
requires that the Environmental Protection Division of the Department of Natural 
Resources be charged with the duty described in that subsection, and that it have 
the authority to regulate the withdrawal, diversion, or impoundment of the surface 
waters of the state, and to require the use of reasonable methods after having 
considered the technical means available for the reduction of pollution and 
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economic factors involved to prevent and control the pollution of the waters of the 
state.  O.C.G.A. § 12-5-21 (b) (Emphasis added).  
Therefore, EPD has been given the implicit authority, through its responsibilities under 
the Water Quality Control Act, to allow the use of a water quality trading program to 
prevent and control pollution of the waters of the state. 
In its Rules related to Water Quality, EPD has included provisions for the degree 
of waste treatment required relative to the issuance of pollution discharge permits.  Ga. 
Comp. R. & Regs. r. 391-3-6-.06.  These provisions would provide a starting point for the 
practical implementation and oversight of WQT in Georgia. 
An additional basis for WQT in Georgia is found in the delegation of NPDES 
permitting under the federal Clean Water Act. A National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permit is required for any discharges of pollutants from a 
point source into navigable waters of the US. The thresholds are established according to 
national technology-based standards, and the conditions of the waters that receive the 
discharge based on state water quality standards. EPA is authorized to delegate NPDES 
permitting authority to the states.  33 U.S.C. § 1342(b), 1344(g).  Georgia became an 
approved state for the NPDES Permit Program in 1974. As such, Georgia could use its 
NPDES permitting authority as a basis for allowing WQT to help point source 
dischargers meet pollutant thresholds.  
 In January 2003, the Environmental Protection Agency provided guidance to 
states interested in WQT by promulgating its “Water Quality Trading Policy” (USEPA, 
2003). The policy states that its purpose is “to encourage states, interstate agencies and 
tribes to develop and implement water quality trading programs for nutrients, sediments 
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and other pollutants where opportunities exist to achieve water quality improvements at 
reduced costs.” The policy further states that “(EPA) believes that market-based 
approaches such as water quality trading provide greater flexibility and have potential to 
achieve water quality and environmental benefits greater than would otherwise be 
achieved under more traditional regulatory approaches.” In an effort to provide states 
with direction on implementation of WQT programs, EPA drew from experiences of pilot 
trading programs in several states in order to make implementation smoother for those 
states interested in developing their own such programs. Georgia policy makers could use 
the EPA policy as a foundation for development of its on WQT framework. In fact, use of 
the EPA policy would provide Georgia with protection against failure to follow the 
guidelines of NPDES permitting. Such failure allows EPA to withdraw approval of a 
state’s delegated authority to issue NPDES permits.  33 U.S.C. § 1342 (c).   
 Recent movements in the Georgia Legislature also provide an opportunity for the 
state to develop a WQT framework. In its 2004 Session, the Georgia General Assembly 
passed HB 237, codified as the “Comprehensive State-wide Water Management Planning 
Act.”  O.C.G.A. §12-5-520 et seq.  This Act calls for Georgia EPD to develop and 
propose a comprehensive state-wide water management plan, to be submitted to the 
Georgia Water Council no later than July 2007. While the statutory guidelines for the 
comprehensive plan are fairly broad, water quality is cited in several sections of the Act.  
O.C.G.A. § 12-5-522.  The consideration of a comprehensive plan provides EPD, the 
Georgia Water Council, and the General Assembly with a unique opportunity to provide 
for the implementation of innovative methods of water quality improvement, including 
WQT. 
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Georgia can also look to other states that have implemented pilot water quality 
trading programs to determine how those jurisdictions provided a legal basis for WQT 
programs. For example, the Colorado General Assembly passed legislation creating the 
Cherry Creek Basin Water Quality Authority, and included the explicit power of that 
Authority to “develop and implement programs to provide credits, incentives, and 
rewards within the Cherry Creek basin plan for water quality control projects.”  Co. Rev. 
Stat. §§ 25-8.5-111.  In Wisconsin, the state legislature passed a more general statute as 
part of its Pollution Discharge Elimination framework, calling for its Department of 
Natural Resources to “administer at least one pilot project to evaluate the trading of water 
pollution credits.”  Wis. Stat. § 283.84.  The statute goes on to outline the requirements 
for a WQT pilot program in Wisconsin. 
Thus, the legal authority to implement WQT is not explicit in Georgia law, but 
sufficient authority is granted by existing law and supported by the EPA WQT policy. 
Other states provide legal models for creating explicit legal authority for trading if 
Georgia chooses to do so. The legal foundation of water quality trading in other states 
and the issue of creating a statewide WQT policy is explored further in section V. 
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IV. Potential Legal Barriers to Implementing Water Quality Trading in Georgia 
Review of the relevant statutes and rules at the federal and state levels does not 
reveal any explicit impediments to WQT in existing law in Georgia. However, a potential 
impediment to trading in Georgia relates to existing water quality regulations in Georgia. 
A common focus of water quality trading projects is nutrients, including nitrogen and 
phosphorus. Trading is possible with other pollutants, but generally, the EPA supports 
trading in nutrients and sediment at this time. Trading in sediment is not well-developed 
at this time. For nutrients, in most Georgia watersheds, nitrogen and phosphorus are not 
regulated or regulated at a level insufficient to support water quality trading at this time 
(Rowles, 2005(a)). 
Nutrient limits exist in the watersheds of six lakes in Georgia: West Point Lake, 
Lake Walter F. George, Lake Jackson, Lake Allatoona, Lake Sidney Lanier, and Carters 
Lake. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 391-3-6-.03.  Additionally, TMDLs for nutrients have 
been developed in the following watersheds: Ocklochonee, Satilla, St. Mary’s, 
Suwannee, and Coosa. However, the limits set by these regulations are generally not 
restrictive enough to drive nutrient trading activity. It is possible that only in the Lake 
Lanier and West Point Lake watersheds are regulations within a range to create an 
economic impetus for trading activity at this time. 
A potential trade will be driven by a cost difference for pollution abatement 
between different sources. As the level of regulation on one type of pollution source (i.e., 
point sources) increases, abatement costs increase, and the difference in abatement costs 
from other pollutant sources (i.e., nonpoint sources) also increases. Furthermore, as the 
level of regulation increases, the costs among point sources may become more variable if 
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the returns to scale become more prominent, and the costs for small source diverge 
widely from large sources. 
A recent analysis of the costs of phosphorus treatment by point sources indicates 
that the marginal costs of abatement may not be adequate to stimulate trading until 
regulation is at least as restrictive as a 0.5 mg/l concentration limit. For example, at a 
limit of 1 mg/l phosphorus, the costs of abatement for a 1 million gallon per day (mgd) 
discharger were estimated between $13 and $40 per pound. For a 20 mgd discharger, the 
costs at the same level were estimated between $7 and $15 per pound. These cost ranges 
overlap directly with cost estimates for nonpoint source abatement, which range from $5 
to $100 per pound (Ross and Associates, 2000; Faeth, 2000; Camacho, 1991; 
Environomics, 1999). With the addition of a trading ratio greater than 1:1 and transaction 
costs, on-site abatement by the point source is likely cost less than compliance through 
trading at this level of regulation.  
If regulation is set at 0.5 mg/l phosphorus, the cost estimate ranges are $89 to 
$122 per pound for a 1 mgd plant and $28 to $34 per pound for a 20 mgd plant. Even at 
this level, only the smallest plants (1 mgd) would be likely to have an economic interest 
in trading. With a 0.13 mg/l phosphorus limit, the cost estimate ranges are $114 to $126 
per pound for a 1 mgd plant and $54 to $59 per pound for a 20 mgd plant. At this level of 
regulation, some larger plants might be interested in trading, but if trading ratios require 
trading at 2:1 or greater, trading is probably still only likely by the smallest plants. At this 
time, regulation of phosphorus this restrictive is found only Chattahoochee River basin. 
Future tightening of nutrient limits may increase the impetus for trading in some 
watersheds.  Tightening may be driven by TMDLs, mass-based load allocations, or the 
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EPA’s effort to promote the adoption of nutrient criteria by the states. TMDL 
development for phosphorus is currently underway in the Lake Allatoona and Lake 
Seminole watersheds. In lake watersheds with existing phosphorus loading limits, as 
communities grow, concentration limits will continue to decrease to maintain loading 
rates. The state of Georgia’s response to the EPA’s nutrient criteria is uncertain at this 
time, but regulation of nutrients is likely to become more prevalent in Georgia as a result 
of this effort. However, until regulation of phosphorus becomes at least as restrictive as 
0.5 mg/l, trading activity would be likely to be limited. 
 Implementation of the anti-degradation clause of Georgia water quality 
regulations may have an effect on the level of nutrient regulation in Georgia. A recent 
Georgia Supreme Court decision regarding the limits for the proposed Gwinnett County 
discharge to Lake Lanier raises questions about how anti-degradation will be 
implemented in Georgia. Hughey v. Gwinnett County, 278 Ga. 740 (2004).  If the 
Georgia Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Georgia anti-degradation rule stands, 
discharge limits on nutrients and other pollutants are likely to become more restrictive 
across the state. The Board of Natural Resources will soon consider a rule change 
proposal that would preclude the implementation of this interpretation on a broader scale 
in Georgia, but the impact of Hughey on future pollution discharges in Georgia is yet to 
be determined. For a further discussion of the Hughey case, see Section VI of this paper. 
Although the current level of regulation and implementation of the anti-
degradation policy could be significant impediments to WQT, a focus on mass-based 
limits under TMDL and future growth in Georgia could create conditions conducive to 
trading in the future. Furthermore, other models for trading (i.e., in addition to point to 
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nonpoint nutrient trading) may offer opportunities for WQT in Georgia (see Rowles, 
2005(a)). Additionally, cross-pollutant trading that allows for exchanges between sources 
of oxygen-demanding wastes and nutrients may also increase opportunities for trading in 
Georgia. Thus, although current regulatory conditions are not favorable for nutrient 
trading, future use of water quality trading is not completely precluded in Georgia. 
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V. WQT Policy Initiatives in Other States 
 
Several states in the U.S. have pursued the adoption of state-level water quality 
trading programs or policies. This section summarizes these state level policy efforts to 
implement WQT. 
A. Michigan 
The state of Michigan adopted WQT rules in November 2002. The rules were 
developed to create an incentive to increase implementation of nonpoint source pollution 
controls. Mich. Admin. Code r. 323.3001-323.3025.  The rules set requirements 
regarding WQT eligibility, baselines (point and nonpoint), notification, and registration. 
Trades are to be governed by the rules and do not require permit modifications. Some 
interesting features of the Michigan rules include: 
• Agricultural nonpoint sources can receive credits for projects that receive NRCS 
financial support to the extent of the local match. 
• A portion of credits generated must be retired to provide a water quality benefit 
(10% of pollutant credits generated by point sources and 50% of pollutant credits 
generated by nonpoint sources). 
• Credit buyers are not liable for credit generators’ actions, but must practice due 
diligence when entering into trades. 
• Review of trades by state agencies is to be completed in 30 days. 
B. Wisconsin 
 
In 1997, Act 27 created three pilot WQT programs to serve as the basis for the 
development of a state trading framework. Wis. Stat. § 283.84.  This Act was adopted to 
explore WQT after the adoption of a statewide 1mg/l limit on phosphorus. Funding for 
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the pilot programs was discontinued in 2002. It was determined that the 1mg/l limit was 
not an adequate driver for WQT in Wisconsin. This finding is consistent with the 
observations made in section II above regarding regulatory drivers for WQT. The state 
did not follow-up the pilot programs with statewide rules, but might explore the issue 
further at a later time. 
C. Virginia 
In May, 2005, the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality held a public 
meeting to accept comments on the proposed issuance of a watershed general permit for 
point source discharges of nutrient and phosphorus to the Chesapeake Bay in order to 
facilitate the state’s compliance with Chesapeake Bay Agreement goals for nutrient 
reductions by 2010. The new general permit will set nutrient waste load allocations for 
point sources, allow point:point source trading to meet waste load allocations, and require 
nonpoint offsets for new or expanding point sources. Action on general permit is 
expected by the State Water Control Board in the fall of 2005. The Chesapeake Bay 
Program adopted WQT guidelines in 2001. These guidelines are intended to provide 
guiding principles for the development of nutrient trading in the states within the 
Chesapeake Bay watershed. 
D. West Virginia 
West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection convened a stakeholders 
committee in 2002 to develop a consensus-based recommendation as to whether water 
quality trading is appropriate for West Virginia. The group was unable to reach a 
consensus about whether developing a state-wide trading program was appropriate for 
West Virginia. As a result, at the completion of the stakeholder group process in 2004, 
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the development of a state WQT program in West Virginia was not pursued. The group’s 
final report makes several recommendations about the implementation of WQT on which 
the group did reach consensus. Group members noted in the final report that national 
momentum toward WQT and other external forces may lead to the development of WQT 
in West Virginia regardless of whether a state policy exists. The team members also note 
that the process was useful in identifying key issues and areas of stakeholder agreement 
for WQT implementation. 
E. North Carolina 
North Carolina was one of the first states to develop a water quality trading 
initiative. WQT was developed in the Tar-Pamlico river basin starting in 1989 as a part of 
the Nutrient Sensitive Waters (NSW) Implementation Strategy for the watershed. When 
the North Carolina Division of Environmental Management proposed new technology-
based nutrient limits for dischargers in the watershed in 1989, a coalition of dischargers 
worked in coalition with two environmental organizations (Environmental Defense and 
Pamlico-Tar River Foundation) to form a basin association and propose a nutrient trading 
program. The program was implemented through an agreement between the association, 
which included the dischargers and the two environmental organizations, and the 
Environmental Management Commission. The agreement allowed dischargers who were 
members of the association to use point:point source trading to meet a collective nutrient 
loading limit. If they exceeded their collective loading limit, the association dischargers 
were required to purchase point:nonpoint offsets in the form of credits from the state 
agricultural best management practice program. The Tar-Pamlico program establishes 
abatement responsibility at the group level as opposed to the individual level. Trading 
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transactions are conducted at the level of the group. The program operates like an 
exceedance tax for point sources implemented at the scale of a watershed-wide permit. 
The program has been implemented in multiple phases and new nonpoint controls 
have been added over time. The state has implemented a similar strategy which allows 
trading in the Neuse River basin. In that trading program, the dischargers’ association can 
purchase nutrient offsets from the state’s wetlands restoration program if they exceed 
their loading limit. The Neuse River trading program has been adopted into rule by the 
Environmental Management Commission (EMC) at N.C. Admin. Code tit. 15A r. 
2B.0240, while the Tar-Pamlico program is implemented through agreements with the 
Environmental Management Commission. 
F. Oregon 
The Oregon Department of Environmental Quality is currently exploring the use 
of WQT in Oregon through a three-year grant from the EPA. The grant is being used to 
identify a model trade in the state that can be used to explore trading in Oregon. Through 
this project, the DEQ has identified a trade involving multiple sources and multiple 
pollutants. The DEQ has issued a watershed-based NPDES permit that incorporates 
permits for four publicly-owned treatment works, one municipal separate storm storage 
system (MS4) permit, and two individual stormwater permits and allows for trading 
among these sources. The pilot trades within this permit will include cross-pollutant 
trades among oxygen demanding wastes and ammonia and trades focused on 
temperature. This arrangement will provide a model for the combined use of watershed-
based permitting and WQT. 
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G. Colorado 
The state of Colorado has been a leader in implementing WQT, and it has trading 
projects in several of its watersheds. The first trading point:nonpoint trading program in 
the country was established in Colorado’s Dillon Lake watershed in 1984 as a part of the 
Dillon Reservoir Control Regulation adopted by the Colorado Water Quality Control 
Commission. Similarly, the Commission adopted the Cherry Creek Control Regulation 
that allowed trading the Cherry Creek basin in 1989. Since then, trading programs have 
been established under the watershed regulations in Bear Creek and Chatfield Reservoir, 
and WQT is being explored in Clear Creek and the Lower Colorado River. In 2004, after 
20 years of developing and implementing WQT in watersheds across the state, the 
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment Water Quality Control Division 
issued a statewide pollutant trading policy that was developed through a stakeholder 
process (CDPHE, 2004). The policy has not been formally adopted as a regulation, but a 
framework through which future WQT initiatives can be designed and considered for 
approval.  
H. Connecticut 
In 2001, the EPA approved a joint TMDL from Connecticut and New York for 
nitrogen loading to Long Island Sound. The TMDL required a 64% reduction in nitrogen 
loading from Connecticut sewage treatment plants that discharge to Long Island Sound. 
To help meet this goal, the Connecticut state legislature passed Public Act 01-180 to 
support the development of nutrient trading among affected dischargers. Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§ 22a-521 to-527.  The Act created the Nitrogen Credit Exchange (NCE), to be overseen 
by the Nitrogen Credit Advisory Board (NCAB), and authorized the issuance of a 
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Nitrogen General Permit to implement trading. Members of the NCAB are appointed by 
the Governor and the General Assembly. The General Permit regulates the discharge of 
nitrogen by 79 sewage treatment plants with individual nitrogen loading limits for each 
facility. The NCE provides performance payments to facilities that over-comply with 
their nitrogen limits while charging an exceedance fee to facilities that exceed their 
nitrogen limits. The general permit has provisions to provide for the equalization of 
environmental impact by the location of facilities to determine incentive payments and 
fees. The aggregate permit limit set by the General Permit declines over time. 
I. Minnesota 
In Minnesota, WQT was incorporated into NPDES permits for two dischargers in 
the Minnesota River basin: Rahr Malting Company in 1997 and the Southern Minnesota 
Beet Sugar Cooperative in 1999. Now, in response to the development of a TMDL for 
phosphorus in the same watershed, a group of 11 municipal dischargers and one private 
discharger formed to consider WQT as a part of TMDL implementation. The group is 
negotiating with the Minnesota Pollution Control Board to issue a watershed-based 
NPDES permit for the group that will incorporate nutrient trading.  
J. Summary of Other State WQT Policy Approaches 
Trading has been developed using a different policy approaches in each state that 
has implemented a WQT initiative. In most states, however, an interest in individual 
trades or trading programs in specific watersheds have preceded the development of 
statewide trading policies. Very few states have adopted statewide WQT policies at this 
time. Interest in WQT has been driven by dischargers, environmental organizations, state 
rule-making commissions, and in some cases, the state legislature. Most trades have 
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required modifications to NPDES permits. The existence of a TMDL has not been 
essential to the development of trading initiatives, although the TMDL process and 
implementation can facilitate the development of WQT. Watershed-based permits and 
general permits have been used to implement trading in several states, including Oregon, 
Connecticut, and Virginia. 
Perhaps the most important issue to consider at the state-level is whether a state-
wide policy for WQT is needed. Only two states have statewide policies at this time: 
Michigan and Colorado. Notably, West Virginia and Wisconsin explored whether to 
create statewide policies on WQT and decided not to do so. Other states have 
demonstrated that existing permitting processes can be used to initiate WQT. The state of 
Oregon has set out to demonstrate effective trades before considering the adoption of a 
statewide policy. Policy development processes can be lengthy and costly. Demonstration 
of the effective use of WQT, if no policy barriers preclude its use, is an appropriate first 
step prior to the development of statewide policy. 
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VI. Other Possible Legal Issues for Water Quality Trading in Georgia 
 
Because WQT programs do not presently exist in Georgia, there are a number of 
unknown legal issues that may arise to preclude or otherwise negatively impact the 
viability of such programs. The implementation of WQT may result in legal actions filed 
by citizens opposed to WQT. One of the provisions of the Georgia Water Quality Control 
Act provides that “any person aggrieved or adversely affected” by the issuance of a 
permit under the Act may challenge the permit and receive an administrative hearing.  
O.C.G.A. § 12-5-43.  Georgia courts have provided a fairly broad interpretation of those 
who may challenge under similarly worded statutes. The threat of legal challenges could 
make the use of WQT inefficient for prospective traders and unpalatable to EPD.  
The Georgia Constitution includes a provision that “the General Assembly shall 
not have the power to grant any donation or gratuity.”  Ga. Const. Art. III, § VI, Para. 
VI (2004).  This constitutional provision has been cited by some as a basis for 
disallowing remuneration for changes in water-related rights. An EPD water withdrawal 
permit does not require a “payment” to the state in order to acquire the permit. By this 
view of the “gratuity clause”, if a permit holder were to receive payment for transferring 
the withdrawal right, the permittee would receive a gratuity from the state in violation of 
this provision of the constitution. Using the same logic, a similar argument could be made 
concerning NPDES permits issued by EPD. That is, since a NPDES permit does not 
require a “payment” from the permittee, any remuneration received as a consequence of 
trading water quality units by a permittee would be a gratuity from the state. This issue 
has yet to be reviewed by the Georgia courts and remains an outstanding issue for WQT 
and other market-based policy instruments. 
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Another possible legal concern involves Georgia’s anti-degradation statute and 
the recent case of Hughey v. Gwinnett County. The Hughey case involved a NPDES 
permit issued to Gwinnett County allowing an additional 40 million gallons of treated 
wastewater to be discharged into Lake Lanier. After determining that such a discharge 
would degrade the water quality in the Lake, the Court held that “before a permit will 
issue to allow the degradation of water quality in Lake Lanier, the clear and unambiguous 
language of Georgia's anti-degradation rules require the permittee to utilize the "highest 
and best [level of treatment] practicable under existing technology." The Court 
determined that “because the treatment plant at issue… is capable of removing more 
pollutants from the discharged water than the permit requires, the permit violates the anti-
degradation rules.”  Hughey v. Gwinnett County, 278 Ga. 740 (2004).  The Court cited 
EPD’s permitting rules, particularly a two part test to determine if water degradation is 
acceptable. First, the degradation must be “justifiable to provide necessary social or 
economic development.” Then, the permit must require the utilization of the "highest and 
best practicable [level of treatment] under existing technology to protect existing 
beneficial water uses.” Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 391-3-6-.03 (2) (b).   
 As Georgia’s surface water resources face higher levels of contaminants due to 
population growth and other factors, it is certainly possible that WQT programs could be 
justified as helping to provide for necessary social or economic development. However, 
arguments are certainly possible that WQT programs would allow point source 
dischargers to avoid implementation of existing technologies that could be used to 
minimize pollution discharge. This avoidance could be considered impermissible under 
current state anti-degradation rules. However, as Justice Hines pointed out in the 
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Dissenting opinion in Hughey, the majority arguably rewrote the anti-degradation 
regulation “to read "the highest and best possible" rather than "the highest and best 
practicable." Hughey at 745.  If the Georgia Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Georgia anti-degradation rule stands, strict adherence to technology requirements would 
create a significant impediment to implementing WQT in the state. The Board of Natural 
Resources will soon consider a rule change proposal that would preclude the 
implementation of this interpretation on a broader scale in Georgia, but the impact of 
Hughey on future pollution discharges in Georgia is yet to be determined, and the 
implications for WQT are uncertain at this time. 
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VII. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Existing law in Georgia provides implicit authority to implement water quality 
trading. However, inadequate regulatory pressure in most Georgia watersheds and 
possible legal challenges create significant impediments at this time. As discussed in this 
paper and others from this research project, the traditional approach to WQT, which 
usually focuses on nutrient trading among point and nonpoint sources, may not be the 
most appropriate model for Georgia at this time. Given the paucity of trading activity in 
WQT initiatives in other states, it may not be the most appropriate WQT model for most 
watersheds at this time. It is likely that this type of WQT can still offer benefits in the 
future. TMDLs and future growth in the state are likely to create conditions more 
conducive to this type of WQT in the next several years. At this time, however, 
alternative models for trading may offer more immediate opportunities for WQT in 
Georgia (see Rowles, 2005(a)). Thus, although current regulatory conditions are not 
favorable for nutrient trading, future use of water quality trading in Georgia is not 
completely precluded. 
Given these conditions, is this an appropriate time to develop a statewide WQT 
policy for Georgia? While a statewide policy could facilitate the development and 
implementation of WQT in Georgia, developing a policy as a first step is probably not 
appropriate. Very few states have adopted statewide WQT policies at this time. Two 
states initiated the process of developing a statewide policy, but abandoned it. A more 
appropriate approach to developing WQT in Georgia would be to demonstrate its use 
with successful trades. The use of pilot trades would provide state policy makers with 
experience in what works well and what does not work well in implementing WQT in 
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Georgia. It would also allow for the development of WQT if and when conditions are 
most appropriate to support beneficial and active use of this tool and avoid the costs of 
jumping onto the WQT “bandwagon” prematurely. Experience with pilot trades will 
highlight the issues that will consistently require the most attention and would be the 
appropriate focus of state-level policy-making. The existing EPA water quality trading 
policy, the trading experience of other states, and state and federal laws and regulations 
should be adequate to guide decision-making in implementing pilot water quality trades 
at this time. By focusing on the development of pilot trades, Georgia policy makers can 
seek to identify what works best for Georgia, rather than trying to predict how WQT 
would be implemented prior to any in-state experience with this policy tool. 
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